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Introduction 
In recent times there has been a catalogue of localised economic and 
industrial disasters in Scotland. The list is an impressive one, including 
Dounreay, Rosyth, Motherwell and Dunoon. Such crises raise questions as to 
the appropriate policy response to the crises associated with industrial 
restructuring and closure. A specific policy instrument employed by central 
government throughout the past decade is that of enterprise zones. At present 
there are four enterprise zones in Scotland - each a specific response to the 
localised problems of economic change and uncertainty. The critical question 
now is whether enterprise zones are an appropriate local response to the 
current difficulties in Scotland and whether further designations should be 
forthcoming. 
Enterprise zones were introduced in the Local Government, Planning 
and Land Act 1980 and the Finance Act 1980. The concept initially formed 
part of a radical legislative and policy programme which was designed to 
redefine the nature and extent of state intervention in Britain. It reset the 
limits to central-local government relations, particularly with respect to local 
authority finance, housing and the operation of the land use planning system. 
Enterprise zones were initially established on an experimental basis for a ten 
year period and were specifically intended "to test how far industrial and 
commercial activity can be encouraged by the removal or streamlined 
administration of certain statutory or administrative controls". <ll Subsequent 
to the enabling legislation, the Government embarked on three successive 
rounds of enterprise zone designation, in 1981, 1983 and more recently in 
1989. As a consequence, over twenty five enterprise zones are now 
operational, albeit at varying stages of maturity, in Britain. 
In Scotland, there are four enterprise zones: at Clydebank (1981), 
Invergordon (1983), Tayside (1983) and Inverclyde (1989). Although the 
Scottish zones were designated at different times throughout the 1980's they 
share some common characteristics. Thus, for example, each enterprise zone 
is located in an area which was suffering acute economic distress at designation 
usually precipitated by the collapse of an individual firm or the escalating 
endemic decline of a particular locality. Furthermore, and as a consequence of 
this, each enterprise zone designation has effectively 'piggy-backed' on 
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established public policy initiatives and measures. These circumstances clearly 
have implications for the perceived political success of the experiment. We 
argue in this paper that the four Scottish enterprise zone designations were 
primarily examples of crisis management and damage limitation rather than a 
comprehensive strategy to secure the redevelopment and regeneration of the 
Scottish economy. 
This paper reviews the nature of the enterprise zone experiment and 
examines the progress, in terms of economic development and physical 
change, in the Scottish enterprise zones.lt attempts to address the question as 
to whether enterprise zones are appropriate to the present day needs of the 
Scottish economy and of the distressed areas in particular. 
The Ideology of the Enterprise Zones Experiment 
At its inception the enterprise zone experiment reflected the economic 
and political philosophy of the first Thatcher Administration which had been 
elected in 1979. This was founded firmly in a commitment to a liberal market 
democracy; with maximum freedom for market forces and a concomitant 
limitation of government controls and regulations over private economic 
interests. For the purposes of this paper the market based philosophy may be 
considered to have had two main effects on local economic policy. 
Firstly, the new approach contested, and effectively rejected, the stability 
of the political consensus over social and economic policy that had prevailed in 
the greater part of the period since 1945. This, for example, had resulted in a 
broad consistency between successive governments over the implementation 
of economic policy. As noted by Wapshott and Brock<2l "the parameters of 
party political debate in the post war years had been fixed" and "the main 
differences between the parties had been restricted to defining exactly where 
the boundary line between private and state industry should be in a mixed 
economy which was agreed by both sides". The significance of this is 
important, for the government's view also stood in marked contrast to 
traditional Conservative thinking. (J) This set the scene for a radically new 
approach to economic policy. Secondly, the Thatcher Administration set 
about designing its own market based approach to social and economic policy. 
This was based much more explicitly and pragmatically on the freedom of 
market forces and the greater restriction of government intervention, 
participation and control. Indeed the role of government was perceived as 
being principally concerned with the provision of incentives (themselves more 
market or price oriented than in the past) to facilitate the more efficient 
operation of the market itself. The commitment to an alternative approach 
was reinforced by the need to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of market 
based solutions to local economic decline and redundancy. 
The government's economic and political philosophy had a number of 
effects on the design and implementation of the policy instruments intended 
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to secure local and regional economic development in Britain. On the one 
hand, for example, the policy instruments which had been inherited from the 
previous Labour Administration were modified so as to reflect more 
accurately the Government's own ideological interpretation of the problems 
associated with an uneven geographical distribution of economic opportunity 
and activity. This was the case, for example, with regional industrial policy 
which was amended in terms of the nature and extent of the geographical 
coverage of assistance- to emphasise selectivity of support, and the level of 
expenditure to be allocated to such industrial intervention. In Scotland, these 
changes had a marked eroding effect on the geography of industrial policy 
assistance. <4l It is important to note that, as a consequence of these changes to 
the regional policy framework, greater emphasis was placed on the regional 
development agencies, including the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board and the Scottish Development Agency, to facilitate more indigenous 
economic activity and industrial development.<5l Even here, however, a 
number of changes were made to the operating remit and objectives of the 
development agencies so as to reflect better the overall market based 
approach. (6) This restructuring process has escalated of course with the 
dissolution of the two development agencies and the introduction of Scottish 
Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise as replacement 
arrangements with broader market oriented responsibilities.(?) 
On the other hand, the Conservative Government introduced its own 
alternative policy instruments. These were designed to complement the 
modified 'conventional' public policy framework for local and regional 
economic development. This raises an interesting question as to why a newly 
elected government, with a political mandate for change and informed by a 
radical economic and political philosophy, should choose to retain inherited 
structures, agencies and policies and simply modify them to their own 
approach. The answer probably lies in a mix of administrative inertia, political 
immaturity and an awareness of the political costs which would be associated 
with the removal of certain policies. Regional industrial policy is a case in 
point. Many areas, such as Scotland, were heavily dependent on public sector 
assistance. The removal of such support would have had a major effect on the 
confidence of Scottish local authorities and inhibited Scotland's ability to 
attact inward investment and to encourage indigenous business activity. 
Furthermore, the government's alternative policy instruments were intended 
to achieve the practical implementation of its radical market based ideas and, 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of such radical measures in comparison with 
the established policy instruments. The alternative measures introduced by 
the government included freeports (as at Prestwick), the enterprise zones, and 
urban development corporations in England and Wales, all of which were 
intended to bring about investment by private investors and developers in 
areas of decline. 
The Enterprise Zone Experiment 
The enterprise zone initiative was 'experimental' in two senses: as a 
'supply side' emphasis on providing incentives to the private sector to 
208 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1992 
undertake investment and development, and the setting of a ten year limit to 
its operation. Furthermore, the initiative was to be monitored and assessed as 
to its contribution to securing economic and physical regeneration in the 
designated localities. The alternative approach of enterprise zones, when 
compared to earlier policy measures, was apparent in the evolution of the idea 
throughout the 1970's. A broad dissatisfaction with the perceived failure of 
conventional interventionist urban development policies had encouraged 
interest in a relatively more 'hands-off or market led approach to local 
economic regeneration. In 1980, however, enterprise zones were introduced 
rather more specifically as part of a free market political agenda. It was 
stressed that the enterprise zones were intended for "areas of economic and 
physical decay where conventional economic policies have not succeeded in 
regenerating self-sustaining economic activity" (Department of the 
Environment, 1980). Furthermore, it was stated that the enterprise zones "will 
be in different parts of the country, and different types of site will be chosen in 
order to test the effectiveness of the approach in different circumstances. The 
establishment of enterprise zones will not be part of regional policy. Nor will it 
have any direct connection with the application of other existing policies such 
as inner city policy, rural development or derelict land policy". The alternative 
approach of the enterprise zone experiment to securing local economic 
regeneration is evident from this statement. This suggests a systematic policy 
framework designed to address the geographically localised problems of 
economic and physical decline and at the same time to demonstrate the 
superiority of market based ideas in solving local economic problems. 
In practice, the enterprise zone experiment was essentially a property-led 
local economic development policy measure. It heralded a new policy 
approach to the problems of localities by emphasising the role of land and 
property as an economic stimulant in its own right. Indeed, it has been 
subsequently argued that progerty development is now taken as synonymous 
with economic development. s) The land and property development focus of 
the enterprise zone experiment was explicitly reflected in the individual 
incentives made available in the designated zones. These were exclusively 
targeted on the regeneration of the local land and property sector of the 
enterprise zones. The incentives included a planning agreement, a number of 
financial provisions and certain administrative arrangements. Each individual 
measure was intended to have an impact on a specific aspect of the land and 
property development process in the designated enterprise zones. We may 
consider these as follows. 
Firstly, the planning agreement is effectively a hybrid of a local plan and 
planning permission. <9l It sets out to ensure that there should be as much 
freedom as possible for different types of development to be accommodated in 
the zones without need to seek the consent of the relevant local planning 
authority. In practice, however, the planning agreements have not created 
'planning free zones', as the local authorities have by means of conditions 
attempted to provide for a managed or structured pattern of development in 
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the zones. The planning agreement was an incentive specifically targeted on 
property developers to streamline or simplify the regulations governing the 
development of land. Secondly, the two principal financial provisions are 
capital allowances for tax purposes and exemptions from rates. Within 
enterprise zones capital allowances for income tax and corporation tax 
purposes are provided for capital expenditure on the construction of industrial 
and commercial buildings and hotels. This incentive is targeted at the actual 
construction of property in the enterprise zones. The exemption from rates 
(now the Uniform Business Rate) applies to industrial, commercial and retail 
property. The measure is an incentive to encourage the occupation of the 
buildings constructed in the zones. Finally, administrative arrangements are 
streamlined, particularly with respect to processing any residual planning 
applications and building regulation approvals, queries about land release and 
availability, and the provision of infrastructure. Similarly there is a reduction 
in government requests for information from firms located in the enterprise 
zones. The complementary measures are intended to address the physical land 
use problems associated with the areas designated as enterprise zones. As one 
commentator stated "the measures are not essentially about liberating private 
enterprise; rather they are about encouraging the physical development of 
specific sites which might otherwise remain vacant, because of their physical 
condition and/or inadequate demand"<10l. 
The Designation of the Scottish Enterprise Zones 
As noted above, the enterprise zone experiment was targeted on specific 
geographical areas of economic decline and physical decay. Indeed, it is the 
latter characteristic that appeared to define the areas subsequently designated 
as enterprise zones. Thus, for example, with respect to the first round of 
enterprise zone designations, it was noted that "all comprise in large part of 
vacant and under-used land. In most of the zones the present position is the 
result of the decline of earlier industrial or commercial activity which has left 
behind seriously damaged land".(ll) Although the second round designations 
appeared to comprise areas of land of superior quality, in the form of 
established industrial estates and greenfield sites, it was clear that a basic 
under-utilised or neglected resource was being identified as the starting point 
for securing a ~rocess which would achieve local economic regeneration in the 
defined areas. 12l A reliance on such descriptions alone of the enterprise zones 
does not, however, capture the poverty of the economic and industrial 
circumstances in the individual zones at the time of designation. It is necessary, 
therefore, to explore the context within which each of the Scottish enterprise 
zone designations was made. 
(a) Clydebank 
The first enterprise zone to be designated was in Clydebank, a town of 
some 54,000 located on the north west periphery of the Clydeside conurbation. 
It developed as an industrial town dominated particularly by shipbuilding and 
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heavy engineering. (!3) The structure of the local economy became more 
unbalanced throughout the post war period. By 1978, for example, some 60% 
of manufacturing employment in Clydebank was concentrated in four major 
firms and, furthermore, the relatively high degree of industrial concentration 
was compounded by their multinational ownership. <14l The Clyde bank 
economy was therefore vulnerable to any external decision making carried out 
by these enterprises. The early 1980's witnessed such a process of 
rationalisation. As Brownrigg notes, by 1982 two of these firms had gone, the 
third had changed hands and the fourth was surviving at a reduced level of 
employment. The local effects were catastrophic. The Singer Sewing Machine 
Co., in particular, closed in 1980 with the loss of 3,000 jobs. As a consequence 
of this concentrated collapse of the Clydebank industrial base the Scottish 
Office established a Working Party to examine the local prospects and 
potential of the local economy. The study documented the inexorable decline 
in employment in Clydebank from 1960 onwards. It pointed out that despite 
considerable government support in the form of regional assistance there had 
been a 25% decline in manufacturing employment over the period 1971 to 
1976, a figure which was compared with 9% for Scotland (Clydebank Working 
Party, 1979). <15l The Working Party recommended the setting up of a Scottish 
Development Agency (SDA) Task Force to address the problems of the local 
economy. This was established in 1980 and initiated schemes for industrial 
promotion, factory building, environmental improvement and the provision of 
advice to small business. This provided the immediate local development 
framework to the local economy and led directly to the formal designation of 
the Clydebank enterprise zone in 1980.<16l 
(b)lnvergordon 
The second enterprise zone was designated at Invergordon, located in 
Easter Ross, some twenty miles north of Inverness. It is part of the Highlands 
and Islands, a regional economy characterised by depopulation, low income 
levels, unemployment, a lack of inward investment and low activity rates. Its 
peripheral location and the problems associated with relative inaccessibility 
have combined to make the region problematic in terms of public policy. The 
Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) established in 1965 was 
given responsibility for securing the economic and social development of the 
region and has implemented strategies designed to attract inward investment 
and enhance indigenous resource based activities.<17) An aspect of the HIDB's 
early industrial development strategy was to attract large scale capital 
intensive enterprises to the region which would be located in key growth 
centres. Invergordon was the preferred location for an aluminium smelter 
operated by the British Aluminium Co. The smelter commenced production in 
1971. Mackay<18l argued that, through the provision of over 700 secure and 
well-paid jobs, it brought a substantial improvement in the economic fortunes 
of an area which was previously experiencing depopulation and high 
unemployment. The problems of establishing a large industrial plant in a rural 
area were alleviated by the special planning arrangements made, and by 
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British Aluminium's determination to integrate its activities and those of its 
employees with the local community and economy. In December 1981 the 
aluminium smelter closed due to deteriorating conditions in world commodity 
markets. There was an immediate loss of some 890 jobs, which represented 
10% of local employment with the result that unemployment reached 24%. 
There was a further multiplier effect on local firms supplying the smelter. The 
effects created a local crisis and the Secretary of State responded by 
establishing 'a study for recovery' by the Scottish Office and the HIDB. This 
recommended action in the form of additional regional assistance to the area 
and the provision of further incentives to create a de facto enterprise zone. As 
a consequence of these recommendations and the political sensitivity of the 
crisis, the Invergordon enterprise zone was granted formal status in the 
summer of 1982. 
(c) Tayside 
The third Scottish enterprise zone was located in the Tayside region, 
based on sites in Dundee and Arbroath. The Dundee local economy, in 
particular, is an example of an unbalanced industrial structure with an over-
representation of (declining) activities and an under-representation of 
growing sectors. Its dependence on jute has been tempered in the post war 
period through diversification into service sector activities, machinery, 
domestic electrical appliances and watches and clocks, but the economy 
remained vulnerable to external influences. <19l The diversification of the local 
economy was facilitated in part by the provision of regional policy assistance 
and this was complemented in the late 1970's with two area-specific projects 
set up by the SDA, the Blackness Project and the Dundee Project. (ZO) The 
Dundee Project, in particular, was very influential as it set out to promote 
Dundee as a location for high-technology based industrial activity. In 1982, 
following the invitation by the Department of the Environment to local 
authorities to tender for enterprise zone designation, a proposal was submitted 
for a Tayside enterprise zone. This was accepted and the enterprise zone 
became operational in January 1984. 
(d) Inverclyde 
The fourth Scottish enterprise zone is located in Inverclyde some twenty 
miles west of Glasgow, on the south bank ofthe Clyde. It forms part ofthe Port 
Glasgow-Greenock-Gourock area of the regional economy. Although in 
physical terms the area appears as if it is an integrated part of the Upper Clyde 
shipbuilding industry, it is actually a distinct labour market in terms of its 
pattern of industrial development and associated journey-to-work flows. <21 l 
Up to the mid 1980's, the local economy was subject to two sets of 
restructuring processes. Firstly, there was a marked decline in the traditional 
industrial sectors which dominated the local labour market. These included 
shipbuilding, marine engineering and associated port-related activities. Over 
the period 1981 to 1984, for example, manufacturing employment declined by 
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14.1% whilst total employment declined by 7.4%. Secondly, there was some 
limited inward investment into the local economy, associated primarily with 
high technology and electronics although this was not sufficient to compensate 
for the decline in the traditional industrial base. As a consequence, 
unemployment in Inverclyde increased from 12.8% (1980) to 18.7% (1984) 
and 21.4% (1987). In 1985, the Scottish Development Agency, in partnership 
with Strathclyde Regional Council and Inverclyde District Council established 
the Inverclyde Initiative. This had the stated objectives of diversifying the 
local industrial base, initiating training programmes in the local area and 
developing new business enterprises. The private sector played a critical role 
in the Inverclyde Initiative, as a broker in the provision of training services to 
the local economy. The Inverclyde enterprise zone was formally opened in 
1989. (22) 
The general impression is reached that the Scottish designations were 
essentially a political response or reaction to a localised crisis. With respect to 
Clydebank and Invergordon the enterprise zone designation followed the 
collapse of key individual plants in the local economy. The Tayside and 
Inverclyde designations were rather more a response to the escalating process 
of localised decline in those particular areas. Each of the enterprise zone 
candidates, however, contained significant areas of redundant land which 
provided the basis for a local property-led economic regeneration framework. 
More significant, however, is the fact that the four enterprise zone 
designations were attached to established programmes of local economic 
assistance. The enterprise zone experiment in Scotland benefited, therefore, 
from a certain degree of local momentum and indeed from a massive injection 
of public sector investment. In no way, therefore, can the four enterprise zones 
be considered as having moved from a 'standing start' with a private sector 
engine. 
The Scottish Enterprise Zones 
We may illustrate the arrangements in the four enterprise zones as 
follows. Firstly, the Clydebank enterprise zone comprised an area of 230 ha., 
of which some 40% was unused at the time of designation. Some 20% of the 
total comprised the buildings vacated by the Singer Sewing Machine Co. which 
formed the centre of the enterprise zone. The principal landowners of the 
designated area were in the public sector, including the SDA (24%), Clyde 
Port Authority (17%) and the local authorities (14%). Secondly, the 
Invergordon enterprise zone is a relatively small area of 60 ha. and is 
composed of two individual sites (Invergordon and Alness). The former is a 
greenfield site lying adjacent to the redundant smelter which also had at 
designation a small number of serviced sites and premises made available by 
the HIDB. At designation the latter was a small industrial estate which 
included a high amenity greenfield area. The principal landowners of the 
enterprise zone were in the public sector, including Highland Regional 
Council (81%) and the HIDB (14%). Thirdly, the Tayside (Dundee -
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Arbroath) enterprise zone comprises 120 ha. in seven individual sites. One site 
is located in Arbroath (36 ha.) and six sites are located throughout Dundee (85 
ha.). There are two enterprise zone authorities- Dundee District Council and 
Angus District Council- who with the SD A, British Rail and the Dundee Port 
Authority are the principal landowners. The sites are diverse in character, 
including greenfield areas, industrial estates, Dundee waterfront and the 
airport. Finally, in Inverclyde the enterprise zone authority is Inverclyde 
District Council. The zone comprises an area of 110 ha. and is composed of 
eleven individual sites. Ownership of the land includes the public sector 
(Inverclyde District Council, Clyde Port Authority, Scottish Development 
Agency) and the private sector. Some sites are in joint ownership. The sites 
vary considerably in size (from 2 ha. to 34 ha.) and in terms of location, land 
use and condition. At designation, the majority of sites required servicing and 
the provision of infrastructure, including sewerage, water and access roads. 
What have the enterprise zones achieved? In 1986, the Department ofthe 
Environment commissioned an economic evaluation of the enterprise zone 
experiment. The evaluation study went beyond the straightforward 
monitoring of the changes that had taken place in the enterprise zones since 
designation to include an identification of the contribution of enterprise zones 
to economic and physical change in the local areas in which they were located 
and to measure the main public costs and benefits associated with the 
experiment. (23l The study concluded that, in addition to creating jobs and firm-
related benefits, the enterprise zone designation "in operating on both the 
demand side and the supply side of property markets has simultaneously 
encouraged the development of new premises in hitherto derelict or neglected 
sites and attracted firms into those premises. In this respect the experiment 
was well designed". In addition to these non-job related benefits, the study 
suggested that enterprise zones had involved the removal of physical 
dereliction and secured the improvement of the environment in the designated 
areas. A subse~uent monitoring report published by the Department of the 
Environment. (2 provides us with an update on the available information 
enabling us to gain an appreciation of the contribution of the overall enterprise 
zone experiment to economic and physical regeneration in Scotland. 
In December 1988, there were 97,600 employees located in the 
established enterprise zones in Britain. This represents an increase of 224% 
since designation. Of the employees, 57% were in industrial activities and 43% 
in the service sector. Of the total jobs, 64% were male and 87% worked full 
time. The greater proportion of jobs was associated with the first round 
enterprise zones and there were significant variations in the number of jobs 
between individual zones. Details are given in Table 1. 
There were 4,344 establishments in the enterprise zones, representing an 
increase of 3,000 since designation, as shown in Table 2. Some 64% of the 
establishments in the enterprise zones were in the first round of designations 
and again individual zones varied considerably. The majority of the 
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Employment % Change since designation 
England: 
Round 1 51,400 185 
Round2 28,700 646 
Total 80,200 (82%) 
Wales: 
Round 1 4,500 118 
Round2 4,500 72 
Total 9,000(9.2%) 
Scotland: 
Round 1 5,800 105 
Round2 2,600 301 
Total 8,300 (8.5%) 
Great Britain: 
Round 1 61,700 169 
Round2 35,800 404 
Total 97,600 ( 100%) 224 
Source: Department of the Environment, 1990 
Table 2: Total Establishments in Enterprise Zones, December 1988 
Establishements % Change since designation 
England: 
Round 1 2,275 240 
Round2 1,245 504 
Total 3,520(81%) 
Wales: 
Round 1 248 214 
Round2 190 13 
Total 438(10%) 
Scotland: 
Round 1 268 31 
Round2 118 372 
Total 386(9%) 
Great Britain: 
Round1 2,791 193 
Round2 1,553 289 
Total 4,344 (100%) 221 
Source: Department of the Environment, 1990 
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establishments were small; 76% of firms employed less than 20 people and less 
than 1% employed more than 500. Almost 60% of the establishments in the 
enterprise zones were engaged in service sector activities. A critical aspect of 
the number of jobs and establishments in the enterprise zones concerns their 
origins. The evaluation study noted that for 1986, some 23% of all firms were 
in the zones at designation; of the post-designation firms, transfers into the 
zones comprised 37%, branches were 14% and new start-ups 25% ofthe total. 
With respect to the physical development of the designated enterprise 
zones the key indicators are the improvement to the stock of land and property 
and the availability of floorspace for subsequent productive use. As shown in 
Tables 3 and 4, by October 1988, some 72% of the total land area of the 
enterprise zones (3,513 ha.) had been developed. Of the total area, 45% had 
been developed since designation. Of the available floorspace in the enterprise 
zones, 80% was located in the English enterprise zones and 70% in the first 
round designations. Furthermore, 42% of available floorspace was in 
industrial use, 42% in warehousing, including open land storage. Office 











































In terms of the costs of the enterprise zone experiment, for the period 
1981-1988, public sector expenditure was £472 million (at 1987-1988 prices). 
Of this estimate, capital allowances accounted for 65% and rates revenue 
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Source: Department of the Environment, 1990. 
were £41 million and public sector infrastructure investment was £188 million. 
Although the earlier evaluation study was able to derive estimates of the public 
cost/job created in the enterprise zones the more up-to-date information does 
not enable us to hazard an estimate. It is worth reiterating the important 
qualification, however, that cost/job estimates are only a partial indicator as 
they exclude the non-job and more intangible benefits arising from, for 
example, an improved local property market. 
We may briefly indicate the contribution ofthe Scottish enterprise zones, 
specifically Clydebank, Tayside and Invergordon. We have to exclude 
Inverclyde at this particular time as it remains at an early stage in its 
development and there is no statistical evidence available as to the changes in 
the enterprise zone. An indication of the part played by the Scottish enterprise 
zones may be gleaned from Tables 1 - 4. With respect to employment, for 
example, 8.5% of total employment is located in Scotland, with the greater 
bulk of those jobs in the Clyde bank zone, the first round designation. This bias 
is also evident in the context of establishments, with 9% of the total in 
Scotland, with Clydebank the main location. It is important to recognise, 
however, that when viewed in percentage terms, the Tayside and lnvergordon 
zones have demonstrated an increase in both jobs and firms. This is also the 
case with respect to the floorspace available and the developed land in the 
Scottish zones, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. A summary, again in percentage 
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terms, of these changes in the post-designation period is presented in Table 5. 
There is no formal evidence available for the Inverclyde enterprise zone, 
because primarily of its much later designation and the fact it is not yet covered 
by the monitoring exercise conducted by the Department of the Environment. 
Preliminary statements suggest, though, that the private sector is beginning to 
express some interest in some of the sites that comprise the Inverclyde 
enterprise zone. <25l 
Table 5: Progress in Scottish Enterprise Zones since Designation 
% Change since Designation 
Clydebank Tayside Invergordon 
Developed land 41 34 79 
Establishments 31 359 400 
Floorspace ('000 sq. m.) 7 151 483 
Employment 105 266 483 
Source: Department of the Environment, 1990. 
From Enterprise Zones to Simplified planning Zones? 
As noted above, the enterprise zone experiment has involved both 
benefits and costs, although it is generally considered by the Government to 
have been a success. Indeed, the relatively late designation of the Inverclyde 
zone suggests that the government was sufficiently convinced that this was the 
correct approach to securing an alternative way forward in a depressed local 
economy. The official evaluation of the enterprise zone experiment suggested 
that the principal measures contributing to the economic and physical 
improvement of the designated enterprise zones were the financial incentives. 
It is of interest, therefore, to note that the government has drawn heavily on its 
belief that the streamlined planning measures were an important element in 
this respect. Indeed, the Government has drawn approving attention to the 
perceived success of the streamlined planning agreements involved, stating 
that they "provide a real stimulus to the development or redevelopment of 
areas in need of regeneration, without leading to a decline in design standards 
or deterioration in the local environment". (Z6) As a consequence, an 
immediate spin-off of the enterprise zone experiment has been the 
introduction of simplified planning zones (SPZ's). 
Subsequently, the Housing and Planning Act 1986 imposed upon local 
planning authorities a duty to consider, as soon as was practicable, whether it 
would be desirable to establish SPZ's and, where it was considered desirable, 
to draw up schemes establishing such zones. SPZ's are intended to act as an 
incentive to property developers by relieving the perceived burden of 
conventional land use planning regulations and procedures on land and 
property development. In Scotland, the Scottish Development Department 
issued practical advice to local planning authorities on the form and content of 
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SPZ's. <27) Critically, it was suggested that in defining an SPZ "there should be a 
demonstrable need to redress physical or economic problems through 
regeneration. SPZ designation should therefore be seen as part of a positive 
programme for the promotion of investment and improvement in targeted 
areas and not simply as the lifting of controls". In addition, it was suggested 
that "land in local authority ownership is not a pre-requisite: SPZ's can help 
clear a path for development without the need for site acquisition or assembly. 
There must, however, be an adequate supply of immediately available land 
capable of sustaining early development". 
In Scotland there is one adopted SPZ, at Dingwall, and two in the 
'pipeline', at Coatbridge and Grangemouth. In Highland Region, the 
Dingwall SPZ was formally adopted in October 1989. The SPZ forms part of a 
greenfield site development of 9 ha. on the periphery of Dingwall. This is 
designated as a Business Park, a high amenity estate intended for industrial 
and commercial activities. In Strathclyde Region, Monklands District Council 
is progressing its designation of a proposed SPZ to form part of a central area 
redevelopment scheme in Coatbridge. In Central Region, Falkirk District 
Council proposed an SPZ forpartofthe Grangemouth Docks in July 1990.lt is 
intended to progress to formal adoption in mid 1991. The main aim of the SPZ 
will be to encourage the economic redevelopment of large areas of under-used 
land in the Docks. The three Scottish SPZ's vary in terms of their prevailing 
physical conditions and their development objectives. It is not the intention 
here to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the SPZ initiative. It is 
important, however, to consider that SPZ's are effectively enterprise zones 
without the financial and fiscal incentives. The latter have been identified as 
the main stimulus to activity by the private sector in enterprise zones and it 
raises the question as to whether SPZ's are the correct extension of the 
enterprise zone experiment. <28l 
Issues and Conclusions 
It is possible to assert on the basis of the available evidence that the 
individual Scottish enterprise zones have experienced a turning round of their 
respective local economies in terms of attracting firms, employment and 
physical regeneration. The key point, of course, is that the effects of the 
enterprise zone measures have been largely localised. There is, however, a 
number of problems associated with attempting to isolate the influence of 
enterprise zones in promoting real structural change in Scotland. In particular, 
without enterprise zone designation, would these areas have regenerated 
anyway and, as supplementary questions, would redevelopment have come as 
quickly or as strongly? 
In many ways it is difficult to undertake this analysis, especially as each 
enterprise zone is unique and therefore, by definition, incomparable in 
regional, structural or historical terms. These, after all, are the reasons for the 
introduction of enterprise zones into the four diverse yet similarly destructured 
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areas. Nevertheless, although normal development programmes and schemes 
by themselves were considered inadequate to the task of reversing the 
localised devastation, some policy makers believe the lessons or perceived 
benefits of the enterprise zone experiment have been distinguishable and the 
evolution of physical and economic planning practice and legislation at the 
sub-regional level has reflected this. The relatively late designation of the 
Inverclyde enterprise zone and the extension of the enterprise zone idea into 
SPZ's is evidence of this line of argument. 
We would argue, however, that the apparent success of the enterprise 
zone experiment is largely an illusion for a number of reasons. Firstly, whilst 
most of the enterprise zones have seen unemployment and physical dereliction 
falling and employment and floorspace available rising over the period since 
designation, these trends have been fair!~ universal outwith the major cities 
since the recession of the early 1980's.<29 By extension, these changes have 
been strongest where the local economy had collapsed after the closure of 
major, dominant exployers. For example, despite their designation as 
enterprise zones, Inverclyde (11.2%) and Clydebank (10.6%) still had the 
third and fourth highest unemployment rates in Strathclyde in late 1990. 
Furthermore, over the period 1979-1988 six of the top ten districts in Britain 
with the largest increases in the number of businesses were in depressed sub-
regions, while all of the bottom eight were in relatively prosperous locales. 
Secondly, there are important distributional aspects to the localised 
effects of the enterprise zone experiment. A problem faced by previous 
researchers is that simple head counts of jobs created or new firms formed in 
the enterprise zones neglecls the extent to which these represent a 
redistribution of activity usually in short distance or short term moves. 
Displacement of employment and companies in this fashion undoubtedly has 
been a major distraction in evaluating the true value of enterprise zones, with 
much of the research and monitoring effort being partial, by necessity. The 
relative paucity of data in the United Kingdom and the lack of information, 
especially on business organisation, economic development and movement, 
often hinders crucial comparative work. The poor supply of factory and office 
premises in the wider regions in which the enterprise zones are located, has 
tended to exaaggerate the impact of the property developments and of the 
'boundary-hopping' moves by firms, and thus the benefits of the provision of 
commercial and industrial space in the four designated areas. (30) 
Finally, in many of the regenerating areas the economic and physical 
turnaround has been achieved with the predominance of public sector 
intervention, especially in packaging land into developable sites. Overcoming 
the failure of the market rather than allowing its free expression lies at the 
heart of the enterprise zone experiment. To a large extent the formation of 
new companies and job creation has been through the concentrated and co-
ordinated efforts of local and central government agencies: the HIDB, SDA, 
Training Agency, Regional and District Councils, working through Task 
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Forces, Initiatives and Agreements, with the private sector gaining the 
benefits of land, labour and capital assistance and subsidies. 
In light of the argument that the success of the Scottish enterprise zone 
experiment is open to question, disentangling any remaining, additional 
benefits of the enterprise zone experiment is critical if the unique importance 
of this form of regeneration is to be established as the basis of future policy. In 
this context, much of the clamour for enterprise zone status elsewhere in 
Scotland is, we believe, because of the enhanced attention this gives to an area 
rather than any specific feature of the designation itself. Thus in the absence or 
erosion of other forms of policy assistance for local economic change, 
enterprise zones (and by entension SPZ's) become by default attractive means 
of support for localities experiencing industrial restructuring and collapse. 
Outwith the zones, the most important impact of the experiment has probably 
been in the acceptance of their value as a mechanism for redevelopment by 
local authorities, and other non-governmental bodies. This, of course, is in 
contrast to the initial scepticism and indeed hostility to enterprise zones by 
local authorities. The evolution of enterprise zones into SPZ's is a move to 
promote the trading off of local control and accountability against greater 
shares of limited government agency budgets. The policy agendas for local 
authorities in the four enterprise zones and in those now promoting SPZ's or 
new enterprise zone status are therefore being more freely surrendered to the 
needs of the market. Enterprise zones are a means of facilitating the crisis 
management of areas experiencing concentrated economic catastrophe and 
industrial collapse rather than the strategic regeneration of the Scottish 
economy. The further irony of this situation is that the enterprise zone 
experiment to date has only worked through the underpinning of local land, 
labour and capital markets by massive public sector interventions. 
M W Danson, Department of Economics and Management, Paisley College. 
M G Lloyd, Department of Land Economy, University of Aberdeen. 
August 1991. 
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